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• Russia is offering China assistance to develop 
its own early warning missile attack system. 
This marks a new area of strategic coopera-
tion between the two states and markedly 
upgrades the potential for China’s strategic 
defense capabilities.
• It remains unclear what the exact nature and 
future trajectory of the early warning system 
initiative and Sino-Russian missile defense 
cooperation more broadly will be.
• China and Russia are unlikely to construct 
an integrated missile defense system akin to 
what the US has with several of its allies.
• Despite Western (recurring) concerns of a 
China-Russia military alliance in the making, 
there are several obstacles for this to happen. 
Nonetheless, the early warning system initia-
tive attests to closer Sino-Russian defense 
cooperation, including in more strategic fields 
and sensitive technologies. The West should 
follow these developments closely.
TAKEAWAYS
At the sidelines of the 16th Valdai Forum in 
Sochi of Russia in October 2019, Russia’s 
President Vladimir Putin announced that 
Russia will assist China in developing an 
early warning missile attack system. As 
Putin said, “We are helping our Chinese 
partners to create a system of warning of a 
missile attack…This is a fundamental thing 
that will considerably, cardinally increase 
China’s defense capability”. An early warning 
system constitutes a highly sophisticated 
and sensitive technology and currently only 
Russia and the US possess this capability. 
While rumors of an early warning system 
cooperation had been floated for some 
years, the announcement nonetheless took 
the international community by surprise. 
Observers and policy experts see the initiative 
as yet another step by China and Russia 
towards forging a military-alliance. But is 
this so? This IFS Insight intends to shed 
some light on Sino-Russian missile defense 
cooperation with a Chinese focus. The paper 
poses the following guiding questions: What 
does China seek to achieve in developing 
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an early warning missile attack system? 
What does the new initiative indicate about 
Sino-Russian missile defense cooperation 
and more broadly about the evolving Sino-
Russian defense and security partnership? 
CHINA’S INTEREST IN AN EARLY 
WARNING SYSTEM 
An early warning missile attack system 
is comprised of technically sophisticated 
networks of ground-based radar systems 
and satellite sensors. The primary objective 
is to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) launches, and then calculate their 
trajectories with the aim to initiate timely 
and relevant defense and counter-responses. 
An early warning system is a necessary 
component in a more comprehensive missile 
defense system, although it can perform 
functions by its own. This includes for 
instance acquiring knowledge of how missile 
defense systems operate and importantly 
gaining time to protect high-value assets 
such as political leadership and military 
facilities and crucial arms assets, for example 
mobile nuclear weapons platforms. Today, 
only the US and Russia have developed 
operational early warning system but other 
countries such as China and India are looking 
to obtain or develop similar capabilities.  
China has for some time devoted interest 
and resources in developing capabilities 
to defend itself from missile challenges, 
from short-range missile threats to ICBMs, 
including efforts to master early warning 
technologies. Today China has developed a 
robust Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) 
architecture over its land territory and 
within 556 km of its coast which relies on 
local radar networks, fighter aircrafts and an 
increasingly advanced arsenal of surface-to-
air (SAM) systems. China’s SAM capabilities 
(which partly can perform missile defense 
functions) consist of both domestically 
produced systems and acquired from abroad, 
mostly from Russia. The most recent system 
includes the S-400 surface-to-air system, 
marking a qualitative upgrade for Chinese air 
and missile defense. Russian defense planners 
claim that they soon will start production 
and deployment of the even more advanced 
S-500 system. If China also buys the S-500, 
it will likely add further sophistication to 
its defense network systems. In addition, 
China is also making strides in its indigenous 
technical competence, for instance with the 
HQ-19 system. The system is an upgraded 
variant of the existing HQ-9 system. 
According to US assessments, the system 
will likely have ballistic missile defense 
capabilities and be operational in 2021.  
That said, China lacks the full knowledge 
and technical equipment for a more 
comprehensive detection system for long-
range missile threats, and especially for 
ICBMs.  For instance, while the S-400 system 
improves China’s air defenses as it fields 
capabilities to destroy aircraft, cruise and 
ballistic missiles, its radar system is limited 
to detect and track aerial targets within a 
range of 600 kilometers and altitudes up 
to 27 kilometers. Its main function is more 
regional, primarily to deny US airpower and 
cruise missile performance in the event of an 
US-China military conflict in the Asia-Pacific 
region, especially over Taiwan. The HQ-19 
system is likely to have a range between 
1000 to 3000 kilometers, which therefore 
can counter medium-range ballistic missiles. 
A more sensitive system with longer range 
would thus allow China to more rapidly 
detect incoming missiles launched from far 
distances and give Beijing more time for 
defense responses, in particular protecting 
its mobile nuclear launch weapons platforms. 
This will also make China’s limited nuclear 
arsenal more survivable (it is estimated 
that China has a stockpile of around 230 
warheads) and therefore increase its 
deterrence posture. Additionally, China 
is developing related capabilities and 
technologies to deal with more long-range 
threats, for example anti-satellite tests 
(ASATS) and counter-space capabilities 
that include ground laser weapons which 
can destroy high altitude targets or disrupt 
satellite communications.
China’s interest in developing an early 
warning system relates to concerns over US 
military strategic capabilities and its nuclear 
strategy. This in itself is fundamentally 
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pushing China and Russia even closer 
together. The two sides enjoy extensive 
diplomatic, energy and military cooperation, 
are increasingly aligned on global affairs 
and also coordinate their policies in various 
regions. Importantly, the growing alignment 
implies that China and Russia have secured 
their common “strategic flanks”. This means 
that they can devote more resources to 
deal with strategic pressure from the US, 
especially in their respective “sphere of 
influence”; for Russia in Europe and for China 
in the Asia-Pacific region while working in 
tandem on global security issues.
Beijing and Moscow have in particular 
strengthened their security collaboration. 
There has been a gradual institutionalization 
of regularized mechanisms for inter-military 
consultations, dialogue on virtually all levels, 
from the top leadership down to regional 
military district level, and even among their 
border garrisons. Arms trade constitutes 
a major component of this cooperation, 
although it has been rather one-dimensional 
with Russia providing China with mainly 
off-the shelf weapons systems and basic 
technology. In recent years, however, the 
relationship has evolved to include a more 
sophisticated and dynamic interaction with 
Russia exporting more advanced weapons 
systems (such as the 2015 sale of 24 SU-35 
combat aircrafts and the mentioned S-400 
system). Joint production schemes are 
emerging, for instance a joint program to 
develop heavy-lift helicopters. China is also 
beginning to provide Russia with weapons 
parts and technical expertise as its domestic 
defense industry is making continuous 
technological advancements. Finally, 
China and Russia have developed more 
sophisticated joint military exercises, not 
least naval exercises, including in sensitive 
areas, for example the South China Sea and in 
European waters, such as in the Baltic Sea in 
2017.   
Notably, there has been growing trends 
towards cooperation in more strategic 
fields and sensitive technologies. China 
and Russia are increasing their efforts on 
cooperation in emerging technologies, such 
as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and 
derived from Beijing’s perception of US 
China policy aimed at constraining growing 
Chinese power and influence in Asia 
utilizing its military might and alliance 
systems. For instance, Beijing calculates 
that a large portion of US nuclear missile 
assets target China, including ground and 
submarine based ballistic missiles. With the 
US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 (the US 
alleged for years Russia violated the treaty), 
Washington has indicated deployment of 
ground-based intermediate ballistic missiles 
on US allied soil in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Incoming attacks from adjacent regions to 
China but also from US territory therefore 
calls for greater Chinese systems with 
improved defense capabilities. 
In addition, China also worries over 
US ballistic missile defenses. Beijing is 
concerned that in the event of a military 
conflict with the US, Washington could take 
out large parts of China’s nuclear forces. 
While China holds a credible second-strike 
capability and has developed a range 
of decoys to deceive US missile defense 
systems, it remains deeply concerned that 
a subsequent Chinese retaliation attack 
nonetheless could be blocked by US missile 
defense capabilities. The effect is that US 
missile defense systems undermine Chinese 
nuclear retaliation capabilities which 
leaves it vulnerable to US nuclear coercion. 
While concerns over US missile defense 
systems differs from fears over US missile 
attacks, they form part and parcel of deep-
rooted security concerns over US strategic 
capabilities and intentions. 
A MORE SOPHISTICATED SINO-
RUSSIAN DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP 
Russia is a long-time player in the missile 
defense technologies domain. In addition, 
Moscow is Beijing’s closest international 
strategic partner. While Sino-Russian 
relations have improved gradually ever 
since the end of the Cold War, growing 
global rivalry between China and the US 
and continued strained US-Russia relations 
following the Ukraine crisis in 2014 is 
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weaponry will further complicate US-China 
relations, although both Beijing and Moscow 
deny that the cooperation is directed 
toward any third party. Moreover, having 
Russian companies provide China with key 
technologies means commercial revenue 
for the Russian defense-industry while also 
lower incentives for China to copy or steal 
Russian defense technology (which has been 
a recurring concern for Russia). For example, 
Russian corporation Vympel is likely involved 
in the process. Vympel possesses technical 
competence to develop systems design to 
counter missile and space-based threats, 
including surveillance and a full range of 
counter-measures. Other reports note that 
the system will be based on Russian Tundra 
satellites and Voronezh ground-based radar 
stations. It is however likely that China 
will want to integrate the main parts itself 
as Beijing wishes to keep full control over 
the system. A related question is whether 
Russia can deliver properly. For instance, 
Russia is planning a domestic roll-out of the 
Tundra satellite system by 2022, but so far 
only a few satellites are in orbit. Technical 
difficulties, commercial challenges and 
political infightings are currently inhibiting 
developments. For instance, the Russian 
Ministry of Defense is suing the company 
behind the satellites, RKK Energia Space 
Corporation, because of failed contract 
obligations, including on Tundra satellites. 
Nonetheless, the early warning initiative 
suggest that China and Russia are breaking 
new ground on issues pertaining to strategic 
missile defense issues. China and Russia 
share a long-standing aversion over US 
missile defense systems in general, and 
particular after the US abrogated the anti-
ballistic missile treaty (ABM-Treaty) in 2001 
which was strongly opposed by Russia and 
especially by China. More recently, both 
China and Russia voiced strong opposition 
to the US deployment of the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 
South Korea. Tellingly, the two sides now 
work together broadly on air defense and 
anti-missile defense systems through the 
initiated AirSpace Security Computer program, 
exemplified by joint computer simulated 
telecommunications. Many of these are so 
called dual-use technologies, with blurred 
lines between civilian and military use 
and applications. Cooperation in AI and 
information technologies, for instance, could 
enhance both countries’ capabilities to 
develop the next generation of autonomous 
and hypersonic military weapons and other 
capabilities. Moreover, in 2017 China and 
Russia signed a three-year road map to 
strengthen military cooperation. According 
to Vasily Kashin, a Russian military expert, 
there are clearly indicated ambitions to boost 
collaboration in areas such as hypersonic 
technology, the construction of nuclear 
submarines, and on strategic missile defense.
STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
COOPERATION 
That said, according to open source 
information, cooperation on strategic missile 
defense has so far not been a particularly 
prominent component in the defense 
partnership. The 2019 early warning system 
initiative announced by President Putin 
therefore marks an interesting step forward.
Details of the content and timeline remain 
elusive but Russia will likely assist China with 
developments of ground based radar systems 
or early warning sensors on satellites, and 
possibly also training of Chinese military 
officers. Some speculate the two sides could 
integrate their systems and jointly share data 
and information about third party launches. 
In practice, the Chinese would be warned 
by Russia of incoming missiles strikes from 
stations in Russia’s north and the Russians 
from Chinse stations in China’s south and 
southeast. For China, the shortest route with 
ICMBs from the US is over the North Pole and 
having Russian assistance in early warning 
would of course be of very helpful to say the 
least. That said, Russia will remain skeptical 
in allowing Chinese integration into its radar 
system network.  
For Russia, the initiative however signals 
to the US that it is prepared to offer China 
highly sensitive technology, which at the 
same time bolsters strategic trust between 
Beijing and Moscow. Cooperation in strategic 
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anti-missile defense drills held in 2017 
and 2018. In addition, Russian and Chinese 
experts are more openly discussing the 
possibilities of a joint Sino-Russian missile 
defense system.  
That said, it remains unclear what 
the exact nature and future trajectory of 
the Sino-Russian early warning system 
cooperation will be, let alone the potential 
for more extensive missile defense 
cooperation. If China and Russia want to 
further increase their cooperation and 
develop an integrated joint Sino-Russian 
missile defense system akin to what the US 
has with several of its allies, this would of 
course mark a truly landmark breakthrough 
in terms of military cooperation between 
the two states. This seems highly unlikely 
though, due to a host of practical (how 
compatible are the systems), political and 
security reasons. 
Moreover, one should be careful with 
assessments regarding China’s plans for a 
potential national ballistic missile defense 
system (although developments toward 
a more limited system should not be 
excluded). China remains skeptical about the 
reliability and costs to develop and manage 
a comprehensive missile defense system; 
indeed many in Chinese strategic circles 
doubt the efficiency of the US ballistic missile 
defense system. More broadly, a missile 
defense system also would pose difficult 
questions to Beijing over whether to change 
to a “launch-on warning” posture, similar 
to the US and Russia. Such a posture would 
imply a radical departure from China’s 
“no-first use” principle, a long-standing 
and core nuclear strategy. That said, an 
early warning system will make Beijing feel 
more confident in relation to other nuclear 
powers. An early warning system provides 
more reliable information on potential 
enemy missile launches, which absent such 
capabilities could lead to launches of nuclear 
weapons due to mistakes or accidents. This 
therefore has a stabilizing effect on global 
strategic stability. A more confident China 
will make the US (and Russia for that matter) 
more relaxed if China also possesses a fully 
operational and reliable system, thus adding 
some mutual confidence between the world’s 
leading nuclear powers.
CLOSE STRATEGIC PARTNERS BUT NO 
ALLIANCE
The West will perceive the early warning 
system cooperation as a sign of tighter 
Sino-Russian military ties, and yet another 
building block towards forging a potential 
military alliance. For the US in particular, 
this will confirm growing beliefs in US 
military and policy circles that Chinese (and 
Russian) strategic capabilities need to be 
countered even more forcefully, itself further 
triggering Chinese and (Russian) views of US 
containment. 
However, there are several obstacles 
and challenges for a formal alliance to 
materialize any time soon. Mutual distrust, 
highly protective and nationalistic industrial-
defense sectors, different economic priorities 
and strengths still constrains Sino-Russian 
defense cooperation, and indeed the overall 
bilateral relationship as such. Moreover, 
China and Russia remain dependent on 
Western trade, technologies and human 
talent exchange and wish to keep coordinal 
links with the West for their economic and 
social development. Finally, both Beijing and 
Moscow value their strategic independence 
deeply. A formal alliance would bind the 
two sides into a commitment they are not 
willing to make; notably to aid the other side 
military in a potential conflict with a third 
party. 
That said, much suggest that Beijing and 
Moscow will continue to strengthen their 
strategic partnership and advance their 
defense cooperation as this benefits both 
countries materially, commercially and not 
least strategically. Seen from Beijing, the 
global security situation is deteriorating with 
intensified security competition with the 
US. The US-China trade war and the global 
response to manage the Covid-19 pandemic 
only accelerate these trends. Facing growing 
US (and EU) technology, investment and 
market restrictions, China is pushed to 
accelerate its own indigenous innovation and 
technology but also to collaborate closer with 
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friendly-minded states to compensate for 
the loss of overseas technology access and 
market opportunities. Russia, being China’s 
closet strategic partner and in possession 
of some key technologies is therefore filling 
an important gap in assisting the further 
modernization of the Chinese military. This 
will also further consolidate the already well 
established security partnership between 
China and Russia. Alliance or not. 
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